TLD Oracle
Claim TLDs in ENS using DNSSEC proofs. DNS registries can register their TLDs by proving ownership through their _ens.nic.{tld} TXT record. The v2 contract enforces a DAO-controlled allowlist of 1,166 post-2012 ICANN New gTLD Program strings eligible for self-serve claims.
Testnet Deployment: This is deployed on Sepolia with a 15-minute timelock for testing. In production, the timelock will be 10 days to allow DAO review.
Allowlist Security Model (v2): Only 1,166 post-2012 ICANN New gTLD Program TLDs are on the contract allowlist and eligible for self-serve claims.
Pre-2012 gTLDs (.com, .net, .org) and ccTLDs (.uk, .de) require a full ENS DAO governance proposal. The nic.tld namespace is only contractually reserved for post-2012 gTLDs under the ICANN New gTLD Agreement, so pre-2012 TLDs need governance approval to prevent fraudulent claims.
Claim TLD
_ens.nic.{tld} TXT record — which only the DNS registry can set.Ready to Claim
P-256These 7 TLDs are on the allowlist and have published _ens.nic.{tld} TXT records with working DNSSEC chains.
Using Algorithm 13 (ECDSA-P256) for lower gas costs. Verisign migrated .com/.net/.edu to P-256 in 2023, signaling industry-wide adoption.
On the Allowlist
1,1661,166 post-2012 ICANN New gTLD Program TLDs are on the contract allowlist and eligible for self-serve claims — but most haven't published their _ens.nic.{tld} TXT records yet.
The allowlist is the contract-level gate; DNS readiness is the practical gate. Check if a specific TLD is on the allowlist below.
nic.tld namespace is only contractually reserved for post-2012 gTLDs under the ICANN New gTLD Agreement. Pre-2012 gTLDs (.com, .net, .org) and ccTLDs (.uk, .de) have no such guarantee, so they need DAO governance approval to prevent fraudulent claims.Governance & Veto
During the timelock window, the ENS DAO or Security Council can veto a pending claim to prevent fraudulent TLD registrations.
- DAO Timelock — ENS governance proposals that pass a vote
- Security Council — A multisig for emergency response (e.g., fraudulent DNS proofs)
- Fraudulent DNSSEC proofs (compromised DNS zone)
- Disputed TLD ownership
- TLD that should require governance approval but was incorrectly allowlisted
function veto(
bytes32 labelHash,
string calldata reason
) external {
// Only DAO or Security Council can veto
if (
msg.sender != daoTimelock &&
msg.sender != securityCouncilMultisig
) revert NotVetoAuthority();
MintRequest storage req = requests[labelHash];
if (req.owner == address(0))
revert NoActiveRequest();
req.vetoed = true;
emit ClaimVetoed(labelHash, msg.sender, reason);
}On testnet, the Security Council is a mock multisig. In production, this will be a Gnosis Safe controlled by elected ENS DAO security council members.
How It Works
Allowlist Check
Contract verifies TLD is on the 1,166-entry post-2012 gTLD allowlist before processing
Setup DNS Record
DNS registry publishes a=0x... in _ens.nic.{tld}
Submit Claim
Fetch DNSSEC proofs and submit claim to TLDMinter contract
Wait for Timelock
15 minutes (testnet) or 10 days (mainnet) for DAO review and potential veto
Execute Claim
After timelock expires, execute to mint the TLD in ENS

